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Introduction
In recent decades, several authors have studied the issue of  the financial 
difficulties of  cooperative businesses from a theoretical point of  view. Many 
have pointed to the problems these businesses had in obtaining investment 
and capitalization – problems which, in the face of  competition from other 
enterprises, severely limited their expansion in the markets. Some researchers 
have highlighted the importance of self-financing as an alternative to the costs 
and risks of  external financing. Agricultural cooperatives, in particular, saw 
self-financing as an attractive option due to the high seasonal concentration 
of  their activities.1 
Several reasons have been put forward to explain these financing prob-
lems, most of  them linked to organizational aspects and to membership be-
haviour. Furubotn and Pejovich2 noted the limited nature of  the objectives of 
the cooperative members: their interest in short-term profit maximization 
made them reluctant to provide enough capital for the self-financing of  la-
* An earlier version of  this article was presented at the Rural History 2015 Conference 
that was held in Girona in September 2015 (panel “Rural cooperatives and their relationship 
with the State”). The authors are grateful for the comments that they received from the partic-
ipants at this panel, as well as for the suggestions of  two anonymous referees. Financial assis-
tance provided by the Spanish government (HAR2015-69620-C2-1-P, HAR2015-64076-P, and 
HAR2016-76814-C2-1-P MINECO/FEDER, EU) and by the Catalan government (2014-
SGR-1345) is also gratefully acknowledged. 
1. Gui (1985).
2. Furubotn & Pejovich (1970).
17168_RHI70.indb   77 6/11/17   9:48
Too little intervention or too much? The contribution of the State to the development of wine cooperatives in Spain
78
bour-managed firms.3 Kremer4 attributed this risk-aversion to the limited li-
ability of  the members, and Hansmann5 to the fact that the cooperative con-
stituted their livelihood. These authors stressed the question of  ownership, 
suggesting that the attainment of  property rights represents an incentive to 
take more risks. Others introduced another key issue into the debate: the low 
living standards of the membership, which discouraged or, in some cases, pre-
vented them from contributing to cooperative financing.6 
Consequently, the economic theory literature has highlighted the impor-
tance of the role of the State in the development of cooperatives, and especial-
ly its contribution to solving the financial and capitalization problems facing 
these concerns.7 Some recent empirical studies of the cooperative movement 
in agriculture have also underlined the role of the State as a major factor.8 This 
is especially clear for entities that required a considerable initial investment, as 
was the case with winemaking cooperatives. Long-term and low-interest loans 
provided by the State have been identified among the main causes of the suc-
cess of wine cooperatives in France in the early twentieth century, in contrast 
to Spain or Italy.9 Moreover, cooperatives could be used by the State as an in-
strument to regulate and stabilize wine markets in times of  overproduction 
and low wine prices.10 The State, then, as the generator of  the legislation that 
created the institutional framework for the development of  the cooperatives, 
and also as the source of  technical and financial support to overcome the ob-
stacles that restricted their expansion, held the key to their success. The lack 
of  official support from the Spanish government has been identified as a key 
reason for the poor development of  wine cooperatives in Spain in the early 
twentieth century;11 later, in stark contrast, the intervention of  Franco’s gov-
ernment has been stressed as the main reason for their large-scale expansion 
under the dictatorship.12
The contribution of the State to the development of the cooperative move-
ment has to be considered in a broader perspective, concerning overall agri-
cultural policies. During the nineteenth century, State intervention in agricul-
tural markets was limited mainly to commercial policy, in the form of tariffs 
and quotas to protect domestic producers from imports. In the early twenti-
eth century, its involvement expanded into many more areas: controls of qual-
 3. Bonin (1983).
 4. Kremer (1996). 
 5. Hansmann (1996).
 6. Ben-Ner (1988).
 7. Vanek (1970); Ben-Ner (1988). 
 8. Farr (2007); Guinnane (2012).
 9. Simpson (2000).
10. Fernández (2008); Fernández & Simpson (2017). 
11. Pan-Montojo (1994); Planas (2016).
12. Fernández (2008); Medina-Albaladejo (2015a).
17168_RHI70.indb   78 6/11/17   9:48
Jordi Planas, Francisco J. Medina-Albaladejo
79
ity, quantity, and prices of  agricultural products were introduced, technical 
changes were encouraged to boost agricultural productivity and competitive-
ness, and in some cases the consolidation of  small farmers’ holdings was pro-
moted.13 Agricultural cooperatives were considered among the most impor-
tant tools in the modern agricultural policies designed to achieve these goals. 
Especially in the wine sector, which since the early twentieth century was af-
fected by constant overproduction, these entities were used as an instrument 
for State intervention and market regulation.14
The aim of this paper is to analyse the relationship between the State and 
the producer cooperatives and, especially, how changes in State intervention 
affected the development of  these firms. In order to do so, we examine the 
evolution of  cooperative wineries in Spain over the course of  the twentieth 
century and up until the present day. In our view, although these entities were 
originally founded on the idea of  “self-help”, they were very sensitive to the 
institutional framework, and legislation as well as direct support (both tech-
nical and financial) provided by the State was critical to their performance. 
We study the development of  wine cooperatives in Spain over three periods: 
firstly, their emergence before the Spanish Civil War (1901-1935); secondly, 
their large-scale expansion under Franco’s dictatorship (1940-1975), and fi-
nally their evolution since the return of  democracy (from 1975 until the pres-
ent day). In these three periods, with the vast differences in terms of  the po-
litical make-up of  the State, the institutional framework for cooperatives was 
radically altered – and so, we will argue, was their performance. 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we present an over-
view of the evolution of  the wine sector and cooperative wineries from the 
early twentieth century onwards. We start by examining the main macroeco-
nomic data of the wine sector (production, consumption, exports, prices), and 
the major problems that it had to face, which to a large extent explain the 
emergence of  the cooperatives. We then present fresh data for a general sur-
vey of  the spread of  wine cooperatives in Spain, paying attention to their un-
even geographical distribution and the difference in the rate of their diffusion. 
In the three following sections, we try to assess this evolution by analysing the 
role of  the State in the cooperatives’ performance during the three aforemen-
tioned periods, pointing out the negative consequences of  the lack of  govern-
ment involvement in the early twentieth century, and also the dangers of State 
intervention later on. The paper ends with some concluding remarks regard-
ing the characteristics of  Spain’s wine industry today and their close relation-
ships with the evolution of  the wine cooperative sector.
13. Tracy (1989); Koning (1994, 2013); Moser & Varley (2013); Planas (2017).
14. Fernández & Simpson (2017).
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The wine sector and cooperative wineries in Spain in the twentieth 
century: an overview
The late nineteenth century, especially the 1880s and 1890s, was the gold-
en age of  Spanish winegrowing.15 The phylloxera plague had gradually de-
stroyed the vineyards in France, the world’s main wine producer and consum-
er, and the export opportunities that suddenly opened up for Spanish wine 
growers led to a significant rise in prices. The area under vine in Spain ex-
panded rapidly to reach 1.7 million hectares by 1889; in the early 1890s wine 
production was 24 million hectolitres and exports reached their peak in 1891 
at 11.3 million hectolitres,16 just before the combination of  the closure of  the 
French market and the arrival of  phylloxera in Spain brought this golden age 
to an end. 
As in other European countries, the Spanish wine sector that emerged af-
ter the phylloxera plague was obliged to change radically in order to adapt to 
a very different international context.17 The replanting of  the vineyards with 
American vines that were resistant to the disease was the only long-term solu-
tion and it was very costly; it did not prove to be a profitable move for the 
winegrowers who made the investment, because the high wine prices of  the 
late nineteenth century were never to return. In the early twentieth century, 
worldwide wine production expanded more rapidly than consumption, and 
the international markets suffered from overproduction. In Spain, the small-
scale growers, who were the majority, were hard-pushed to adapt to the new 
situation. Their running costs increased because of  rising salaries and the 
need for fertilizers and other costly chemical inputs to prevent the downy mil-
dew and other vine diseases affecting the new vines. Due to their lack of  cash 
flow and their limited storage capacity, the winegrowers had to sell their pro-
duction even if  prices were low. To increase their revenue they tried to pro-
duce greater quantities, but this only depressed the prices still further. In this 
difficult situation, the creation of cooperative wineries in order to reduce out-
lay, encourage joint production and marketing, and improve the quality of 
the wine, and State intervention in the wine markets to control overproduc-
tion, were attempts to limit the damage.18 
Figure 1 shows that wine prices did not recover over the course of the twen-
tieth century, with dramatic falls in the 1920s and the 1950s. Moreover, annu-
al production fluctuated considerably – as did prices, because consumption 
varied little. In consequence, supply and demand were difficult to match and 
15. Pan-Montojo (1994). 
16. Pinilla (2014).
17. Pinilla & Ayuda (2002); Pan-Montojo (2009); Simpson (2011); Fernández & Pini- 
lla (2014).
18. Planas (2016, 2017).
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winegrowers suffered from recurrent crises of  overproduction. It was only in 
the last decade of  the twentieth century that prices visibly rose, as a result of 
the expansion of exports after Spain’s entry to the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) (Figure 2). Except for this last period, the evolution of  prices 
was largely a reflection of production, which grew strongly from 1950 to 1980 
due mainly to the increase in vine yields, which doubled from 12 Hl/Ha in 
1946 to 24 Hl/Ha in 1980, although the area under vine also rose from 1.4 
million to 1.7 million hectares in the same period. This was precisely the time 
when most of  Spain’s wine cooperatives were created.
Figure 2 displays the evolution of wine production with domestic consump-
tion, exports, and distillations, which became an important outlet for wine sur-
pluses from the 1970s onwards. Wine consumption per capita throughout the 
twentieth century was considerably lower in Spain than in other European 
countries: in the 1930s, it was only 44% of that of  France and 78% of that of 
Italy; the consumption per capita fell in those countries in the following dec-
ades, but fell at a similar rate in Spain and in the 1970s it was still 35% lower 
FIGURE 1 ▪ Wine prices and wine production in Spain, 1913-2000 (constant 1995 
pesetas and hectolitres, 100=1995, and five-year moving averages)
Note: wholesale prices are shown for the period 1913-1935; prices received by farmers are shown for the period 
1936-2000.
Sources: 1913-1935: Carreras & Tafunell (2005), pp. 336-337; 1936-2000: Ministerio de Agricultura, Anuario de Es-
tadística Agraria, Madrid, several years; implicit agricultural GDP deflator: Carreras & Tafunell (2005), pp. 1357-1358. 
Authors’ creation.
17168_RHI70.indb   81 6/11/17   9:48
Too little intervention or too much? The contribution of the State to the development of wine cooperatives in Spain
82
than in France and Italy.19 From the 1970s onwards total domestic consump-
tion fell steadily and by the early 2000s it was overtaken by exports, which 
rose notably when Spain became a member of  the EEC in 1986. After ac-
counting for less than 5 million hectolitres for most of  the twentieth century 
(much lower in the 1940s and 1950s), Spanish exports surpassed the peak lev-
els recorded a century before. The fall in domestic consumption, while pro-
duction remained high, was in some part offset by a sharp increase in distil-
lations, which accounted for more than 10 million hectolitres in the 1970s and 
1980s. As we will see later, cooperative wineries were an important stakehold-
er in this crucial outlet for wine surpluses.
Naturally, wine production did not increase everywhere, or at the same 
pace. In fact, the regional distribution of  production changed considerably 
over the course of  the twentieth century (Figure 3). Catalonia, the main wine-
19. Fernández & Simpson (2017).
FIGURE 2 ▪ Production, exports, consumption, and distillations of wine in Spain, 1900-
2010 (millions of hectolitres). Five-year moving averages
Note: direct consumption and distillation data for the period 1900-1960 have been calculated by subtracting exports 
and stocks in the previous campaign from the total production. This methodology is used by Faostat to calculate the 
Food Balance Sheets from 1961 onwards. Stocks have been considered as 6% of total production, which is the mean 
figure for stocks in the period 1961-1970 according to the FAO data. We have used the same methodology to calcu-
late direct consumption (87% of internal consumption) and distillation (13%). From 1961 to 2010 the Faostat Data-
base provides full detailed data. 
Sources: 1900-1960: Mitchell (2007); 1961-2010: Faostat Database, http://faostat3.fao.org/home/E. Authors’ creation.
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FIGURE 3 ▪ Main wine producing regions in Spain, 1916 and 1980  
(Millions of hectolitres)
Source: Ministerio de Agricultura, Anuario de Estadística Agraria, Madrid, 1916 and 1980. Authors’ creation.
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growing region in the early years, gradually reduced its area under vine (from 
228,780 hectares in 1916 to 102,787 by 1980) and its production also halved. 
In contrast, Castile-La Mancha expanded its wine production nearly tenfold 
and in 1980 was responsible for half  the total Spanish output. Extremadura 
and Andalusia also increased their wine production sharply from the 1950s 
onwards, and by 1980 they had overtaken Catalonia. La Rioja expanded more 
gradually, but steadily nonetheless, and by 1980 it had increased its wine pro-
duction tenfold. Obviously, in our examination of the spread of cooperative 
wineries, we should bear in mind these changes in the regional distribution of 
wine production, but we will see that they do not always match – as the com-
parison between La Rioja and Navarre clearly shows.20
Below we present the data we have compiled for a general survey of  the 
evolution of  the cooperative wineries in Spain since the early twentieth cen-
tury, when the first entities were created, until the present day. Table 1 shows 
some aggregate data, while Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 4 focus on the regional 
distribution of  the cooperatives and reflect the contribution of  the State.
The first cooperative wineries in Spain were built in 1901. Elsewhere in Eu-
rope, cooperatives had emerged in the late nineteenth century in Germany, Aus-
20. The relationship between cooperative wineries and wine production is not one-way: 
in some regions cooperatives were an essential factor in the intensification of  production.
TABLE 1 ▪ Number of cooperative wineries, membership, storage capacity  











1905  2 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
1915  21 3,150 150 8  1.9
1921  88 n.d. n.d. 11*  4.5
1935 116 n.d. 130 n.d. n.d.
1947 154 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
1954 324 65,610 207 11* 16.3
1961 547 111,833 204 8* 23.7
1969 782 213,988 274 25 49.9
1980 855 239,889 281 33 63.6
2008 625 172,000 273  n.d. 70.0
* Average production of cooperative wineries.
Sources: 1905: Piqueras (2011), Planas (2016); 1915: Campllonch (1917), Equiza (1996), Piqueras (2011), Planas 
(2016); 1921: Pan-Montojo (2003), p. 328; 1935: Equiza (1996), Piqueras (2011), Planas (2016); 1947: Tarín (1946-
47); 1954: La Semana Vitivinícola, n. 483-4 (1955), p. 31; 1961 and 1969:  Fernández (2008), p. 165-168; 1980: Cir-
cular informativa n. 7/80 de la Junta Nacional de Cooperativas Vitivinícolas (Unión Nacional de Cooperativas del 
Campo); 2008: COGECA (2010). Authors’ creation.
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tria-Hungary, Switzerland, and Italy;21 in France there were few attempts to set 
up wine cooperatives before 1900, but they spread rapidly in the interwar peri-
od and by 1939 there were 827 wine cooperatives in operation22 – a figure that 
was not reached in Spain until the 1970s (Table 1). Compared to its neighbour, 
the emergence of wine cooperatives in Spain was slow and weak for a long time: 
on the eve of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) there were roughly a hundred 
cooperative wineries operating in Spain, while in France there were about eight 
times as many. As we will argue, the role of the State can explain the difference 
in the rate of the spread of wine cooperatives in the two countries.
On the other hand, during the second half  of  the century the expansion 
of cooperative wineries was very fast in Spain, not only in terms of their num-
ber, which had barely increased in the 1940s but rose exponentially from then 
on, but also in terms of  their size: in only four years between 1953 and 1957, 
some 121 wine cooperative wineries were created, raising the number from 
286 to 407, and their storage capacity increased by almost two million hecto-
litres from 3.8 to 5.7 Hl;23 in the 1960s their membership nearly doubled, and 
their share of  total wine production rose from 24% to 50%, reaching nearly 
two thirds in 1980 (Table 1). Again, as we will argue, State intervention was 
the key factor in this rapid development.
Like their counterparts in other countries,24 in the late twentieth century 
Spanish wine cooperatives found it hard to adapt to the changes in the wine 
market and their numbers fell. Significantly, however, their productive ca-
pacity still increased, and at the beginning of  the new century they were re-
sponsible for 70% of  the total output. This level of  production was largely 
the result of  EEC wine policies (Spain having joined the Community in the 
mid-1980s), in particular regarding the assistance for compulsory distillation 
mentioned above. 
Inside this general evolution, there were many differences at regional lev-
els. The first two cooperative wineries were created in 1901 in Castile-La Man-
cha and Catalonia, the two major winegrowing regions, but in the following 
years the numbers of  cooperatives grew only in Catalonia; in 1935, the region 
had 81 wine cooperatives in operation, compared with only six in Castile-La 
Mancha (Table 2). Although in Catalonia vinegrowing was much more inten-
sive, with much higher yields, volumes of production were similar; but in terms 
of  the spread of  wine cooperatives Castile-La Mancha lagged far behind 
Cata lonia and also behind Navarre and Valencia, both regions with a much 
smaller wine production.
21. Berget (1902).
22. Lachiver (1988), p. 498.
23. Carrión (1974), p. 343.
24. Chevet (2009); Fernández & Simpson (2017).
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As Table 2 and Figure 4 show, in the 1950s and 1960s the overall number 
of  wine cooperatives increased markedly, and there was also a notable geo-
graphical redistribution in the Franco years. In Catalonia, after a slight fall 
during the aftermath of  the Civil War, the number of  cooperatives increased 
and had doubled by the end of  the 1960s. By then, however, Catalonia was 
no longer the region with the most wine cooperatives: in twenty years, the 
number of  cooperatives in Castile-La Mancha had risen nearly tenfold. Its 
area under vine and wine production had also increased, but by no means in 
proportion: La Mancha’s share of  the wine cooperatives in Spain had risen 
from 5% in 1935 to around a quarter in the late 1960s, but its share of  wine 
production had increased only slightly. Moreover, the wineries were now 
much larger, both in membership and storage capacity. Reflecting a sort of 
path dependence, in Catalonia the average membership was still below 200 in 
the 1960s, and many wine cooperatives had a storage capacity of  less than 
10,000 Hl, which was considered too small to achieve satisfactory economic 
results.25 The storage capacity of  the Catalan cooperatives was the smallest 
of  all the regions, far below the average, and less than half  that of  the coop-
eratives in Castile-La Mancha (Table 3).
Navarre and Valencia had very few cooperatives prior to the Civil War, but 
numbers rose sharply under the dictatorship (Table 2 and Figure 4). In Navarre, 
the 1940s saw notable progress in the form of a threefold increase in numbers 
in ten years, and by the mid-1950s the region was home to nearly 20% of the 
country’s cooperative wineries, though it accounted for only 5% of national 
wine production and 2.5% of the area under vine. By the end of the 1950s wine 
cooperatives produced 70% of Navarrese wine.26 Valencia started its great ex-
pansion a little later, in the 1960s, and trailed Castile-La Mancha and Catalo-
nia in terms of number of cooperatives (Table 2). However, its production was 
lower than Catalonia’s until 1980, and only about one sixth of that of Cas-
tile-La Mancha. As for the size of the cooperatives, the expansion of Valencia 
was the most striking, both in membership and in storage capacity (Table 3).
During the 1960s the cooperative movement also took off  in other regions 
with little cooperative tradition, such as in Castile-Leon, Andalusia, Aragon, 
Extremadura, and, to a certain extent, La Rioja (Table 2 and Figure 4). Con-
sequently, in the late twentieth century the diffusion of  the wine cooperatives 
was broader; but Castile-La Mancha clearly headed the ranking in terms of 
numbers of  cooperatives and their size, and in 2009 it still accounted for 
around a third of  the total (Table 2).
25. Tarín (1946-47), p. 374.
26. Equiza (1996), p. 135.
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TABLE 2 ▪ 
 A. Regional distribution of cooperative wineries in Spain, 1915-2009  
(number of coops.)
Region 1915 1935 1947 1954 1969 1980 2009
Catalonia 12 81 74 106 172 170 85
C.-La Mancha 3 6 13 58 198 224 190
Valencia 0 9 21 43 115 124 73
Navarre 3 10 30 64 75 68 68
C.-Leon 1 3 3 13 65 73 38
Andalusia 0 1 6 5 40 56 41
Aragon 0 0 1 8 60 62 32
La Rioja 1 2 0 4 20 21 27
Extremadura 0 0 0 1 10 17 26
Other* 1 4 6 22 27 40 33
Spain 21 116 154 324 782 855 613
B. Regional distribution of cooperative wineries in Spain, 1915-2009 (%)
Region 1915 1935 1947 1954 1969 1980 2009
Catalonia 57.1 69.8 48.1 32.7 22.0 19.9 13.9
C.-La Mancha 14.3 5.2 8.4 17.9 25.3 26.2 31.0
Valencia 0.0 7.8 13.6 13.3 14.7 14.5 11.9
Navarre 14.3 8.6 19.5 19.8 9.6 8.0 11.1
C.-Leon 4.8 2.6 1.9 4.0 8.3 8.5 6.2
Andalusia 0.0 0.9 3.9 1.5 5.1 6.5 6.7
Aragon 0.0 0.0 0.6 2.5 7.7 7.3 5.2
La Rioja 4.8 1.7 0.0 1.2 2.6 2.5 4.4
Extremadura 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.3 2.0 4.2
Other* 4.8 3.4 3.9 6.8 3.5 4.7 5.4
Spain 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* Basque Country, Canary Islands, Galicia, Madrid, Majorca, Murcia.
Sources: see Table 1; 2009: Confederación de Cooperativas Agrarias de España http://www.agro-alimentarias.coop/
inicio. Authors’ creation.
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In our view, the evolution that has just been described is closely related to 
the role of the State. Over the next three sections, we will try to shed light on 
the evolution of wine cooperatives in Spain throughout the twentieth century, 
focusing in particular on the role of the State in three major periods: the ear-
ly years (1901-1935), the years of the “big spread” (1940-1975), and the late 
twentieth century and the early years of the twenty-first century (1975-present 
day).
FIGURE 4 ▪ Regional distribution of cooperative wineries in Spain, 1935, 1947, 1954, 
1969 (number of cooperative wineries per province)
Sources: see Table 1. Authors’ creation.
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The early years: cooperative wineries in Spain prior to the Civil War 
(1901-1935)
In the early twentieth century, Spanish governments provided very little 
support for the creation of  agricultural cooperatives. They were particularly 
reluctant to promote cooperative wineries, which needed much more funding 
and technical assistance than other kinds. After the passing of  the Agricul-
tural Syndicates Act (Ley de Sindicatos Agrícolas)27 in 1906, which included 
fiscal incentives for the creation of agricultural cooperatives, the Spanish gov-
ernment was unwilling to let wine cooperatives enjoy the benefits of  the new 
legislation, as the first wine cooperative founded after its approval would dis-
cover to its cost.28 Nor did the government approve any other measures to en-
courage the creation of  wine cooperatives in the early years of  the century. 
A bill presented in parliament in 1914 to offer subsidies and low-interest loans 
to winemaking cooperatives was rejected. The government did not set up a 
27. The Agricultural Syndicates Act has been considered the starting point for the ex-
pansion of  agricultural cooperatives. See Garrido (1996, 2007). But the government’s hesitan-
cy with regard to its implementation has also been underlined. See Garrido (1994).
28. Planas (2015).
TABLE 3 ▪ Evolution of the size of the cooperative wineries in Spain, 1915-1980 
(membership per winery and thousands of hectolitres of storage capacity per winery)
1915 1954 1969 1980
Memb. Th.Hl Memb. Th.Hl** Memb. Th.Hl Memb. Th.Hl
Catalonia 124 8 262  9 196 16 191 19
C.-La Mancha 270 n.d. 164 11 237 35 301 49
Valencia 223 11 381 26 350 32
Navarre 160 10 179 16 217 19 207 23
C.-Leon 160 n.d. 127 10 278 24 318 25
Andalusia 128  7 214 21 263 32
Aragon 120  7 394 24 365 31
La Rioja n.d. n.d.  31  6 402 28 345 32
Extremadura 589 10 406 22 146 22
Other* n.d. n.d. 151 10 398 40 305 55
Spain 150 8 202 11 274 25 281 33
* Basque Country, Canary Islands, Galicia, Madrid, Majorca, Murcia.
** Average production of cooperative wineries.
Sources: see Table 1. Authors’ creation.
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credit system for cooperatives, and the central bank imposed severe restric-
tions on borrowing. The bureaucratic inertia of  Spanish authorities at the 
time clearly contrasts with the technical and financial support provided by 
the French government to its wine cooperatives,29 and it has been identified 
as a key factor in the differences in performance of  the wine cooperatives in 
the two countries.30 
As noted above, Catalonia was the only region in Spain where wine coop-
eratives experienced some development prior to the Civil War. A variety of cir-
cumstances have been considered in the attempts to explain their emergence 
then, such as the region’s proximity to the French Midi, where cooperative win-
eries spread very rapidly in the early twentieth century, or the stock of pre-ex-
isting social capital in the form of a dense network of associations that aided 
cooperation;31 but a major factor was surely the contribution of the regional 
government set up in Catalonia. In 1914, the administrative bodies of the four 
Catalan provinces merged to build an autonomous government (Mancomuni-
tat), which paved the way for the later creation of a new regional government 
with more competencies (Generalitat). This was unique for a regional govern-
ment in Spain, and it allowed for the introduction of a modern agricultural 
policy that included an intense campaign in the rural areas of Catalonia to en-
courage the formation of winemaking cooperatives.32 The Mancomunitat had 
very few financial resources (no more than the funds provided by the provin-
cial boards that were its members), but it created technical and financial ser-
vices that supervised the designs for the new cellars, gave advice regarding the 
machinery required, and provided assistance in the construction of the coop-
eratives, and in the winemaking process itself. Because of the lack of funds, 
the Mancomunitat could not provide loans in optimal conditions (in fact, most 
of the financial assistance came from commercial banks), but in some cases 
that financial aid, albeit limited, was crucial for the consolidation of new pro-
jects. An official service was set up to promote the creation of agricultural co-
operatives, which organized meetings and provided advice and assistance, and 
paid particular attention to cooperative wineries.
These official services were closed down after Primo de Rivera’s coup 
d’état in 1923 and were only reopened after the proclamation of  the Second 
Republic in 1931 and the establishment of  a new autonomous government, 
the Generalitat. But this government would not last long, because in 1936 an-
other coup d’état, this time led by Franco, triggered the Spanish Civil War. 
29. On the contribution of the French government to the development of cooperative win-
eries in the early twentieth century, see Warner (1960), Rinaudo (1985), and Gavignaud-Fontaine 
(1986). 
30. Simpson (2000); Fernández (2008); Fernández & Simpson (2017).
31. Planas (2016).
32. Casanovas (1998); Planas (2015).
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Short-lived and with very few financial resources, these agricultural services 
were unable to consolidate the emerging cooperative movement in Catalonia. 
Moreover, social and political divisions between the winegrowers hindered 
the development of  cooperatives.33 In the 1930s the cooperatives were few, 
their storage capacity was small, and they often faced serious financial prob-
lems; nevertheless, the Catalan government’s commitment to their develop-
ment had gone some way to compensating for the lack of  response from the 
central Spanish authorities. It is clear that this limited help made a critical 
difference, if  we take into account that most of  the wine cooperatives operat-
ing in Catalonia at the outbreak of  the Civil War had been created during the 
brief  existence of  the Catalan government.34
As we will see, the next stage in the development of  the cooperatives took 
place in very different circumstances. The Catalan government’s contribution 
consisted mainly of encouraging initiatives that emerged bottom-up. This was 
not the case under Franco’s authoritarian government, which subjected them 
to strict institutional control. However, it was in this new period when most 
of  the wine cooperatives were created in Spain, and, as we will see, the role of 
the State was again a key factor.
The “big spread” under the Franco regime (1940-1975)
The agricultural policy of  the Franco regime was highly interventionist. 
The dictatorship used cooperative wineries as means of  industrializing the 
wine producing regions and regulating wine prices, as well as a tool for social 
control. In the new political context, cooperatives were integrated in a new 
institutional system and subjected to strong control by the government.35 The 
cooperatives created before the Spanish Civil War were politically purged, and 
Republican members expelled. As we have seen, most of  them were located 
in Catalonia, which could explain the fall in their number in this region from 
1935 to 1947 (Table 2). Cooperatives had to adapt to the new rules imposed 
by the authoritarian regime and were forced to join its new institutional 
framework. By no means social control was subordinated to the agricultural 
modernization.
The Cooperation Act (Ley de Cooperación), passed in 1942 and in force 
until 1974, established the institutional and organizational design of  cooper-
atives. The rules were imposed from above in a standardized process and the 
33. Planas & Valls-Junyent (2011).
34. Planas (2016).
35. Lanero (2011); Medina-Albaladejo (2011); Román (2013); Cabana & Díaz- 
Geada (2014).
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cooperative sector was placed inside a corporatist structure, the National 
Trade Union (Central Nacional Sindicalista, CNS), under the discipline of the 
Institutional Association for Cooperation (Obra Sindical de Cooperación, 
OSC). The authoritarian OSC organized the cooperatives and exerted strict 
institutional control over them: it oversaw their boards, appointed the mem-
bers of  their supervisory committees (Consejos de Vigilancia), and revised 
their statutes, reports and balance sheets.36
However, in contrast to the previous period, the cooperative wineries now 
received significant levels of  financial aid from the State. The government 
helped the cooperatives mainly through long-term loans, especially for the 
construction or enlargement of  the wineries and the purchase of  machinery, 
and also provided short-term loans for their management when necessary. 
This financial support came from public institutions such as the OSC, the 
Ministry of  Agriculture, and the National Institute of  Rural Colonization 
(Instituto Nacional de Colonización, INC), and was supplied first by the Na-
tional Service of  Agricultural Credit (Servicio Nacional de Crédito Agrícola, 
SNCA) and later by the Agricultural Credit Bank (Banco de Crédito Agríco-
la, BCA). The SNCA had provided public financial assistance for Spanish ag-
riculture since 1925,37 and in 1962 it was replaced in this task by the newly-cre-
ated BCA.38
The mission of  these institutions was to promote the modernization of 
Spanish agriculture. By means of  financial support they encouraged mecha-
nization, the use of  fertilizers, the optimal use of  water resources, and the in-
dustrial processing of  agricultural produce. The main targets were to reduce 
production costs and to raise productivity.39 As cooperatives were considered 
an ideal tool to achieve these goals, the SNCA and the BCA encouraged their 
spread by awarding grants or low-interest loans. In the specific case of  wine 
cooperatives, the crisis of  wine prices from the mid-1940s onwards (Figure 1) 
made the task particularly urgent.
The impact of  State financial aid on the spread of  cooperative wineries 
can be seen in Table 4. In 1961, there were 547 wine cooperatives operating in 
Spain, and 326 (around 60%) had received financial assistance to the tune of 
580 million pesetas from the SNCA since 1947, benefiting 58,000 growers. 
This aid raised the productive capacity of the Spanish cooperatives by 4.3 mil-
lion hectolitres, which was more than a third of  the total capacity of  the wine 
36. Romero (1981).
37. Gámez (1997).
38. Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), Ministerio de Agricultura, 61/13058. 
Documentación del Banco de Crédito Agrícola.
39. SNCA, Memoria, Madrid (several years); AGA, Ministerio de Agricultura, 61/13058. 
Documentación del Banco de Crédito Agrícola.
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cooperative sector (11.4 million hectolitres in 1965).40 More than a quarter of 
this financial help was for cooperatives from Castile-La Mancha and 16% for 
the region of Valencia, and this raised the productive capacity in each of these 
regions by approximately one million hectolitres – about half  of  the total in-
crease in Spain (Table 4).41 They were followed by Castile-Leon, Aragon and 
Andalusia, regions with hardly any cooperative tradition, while very few co-
operative wineries in Catalonia received any financial support (only 4.5% of 
the total amount, despite the fact that Catalonia was home to more than 20% 
of Spain’s wine cooperatives). The State clearly preferred to support newly 
created entities which were easier to adapt to the dictatorship’s rules. Also, in 
Catalonia, much of  the limited financial assistance available was assigned to 
the foundation of  new wine cooperatives in areas where there were very few, 
such as Terra Alta and Ribera d’Ebre.42 
Again, this fact shows that social control was an absolute priority for the 
government. But the expansion of  the cooperative wineries was also an in-
40. Huetz de Lemps (1967), vol. 2, p. 782.
41. In the province of  Valencia, two thirds of  the 54 cooperative wineries had received 
financial aid from the SNCA; in total, 78 million pesetas were destined to expanding produc-
tive capacity. According to the data provided by Pascual Carrión (an important agricultural 
engineer in those years), cooperatives produced 40% of the total wine production in Valencia, 
while the average in Spain was less than 24% (Table 1). See Carrión (1960), p. 34-36.
42. Medina-Albaladejo (2015b).




(millions of ptas.) %
Aided 
coops. Capacity increase (Hl)
C.-La Mancha1 171 29.5 107 1,576,007
Valencia 95 16.4 65 936,610
C.-Leon2 80 13.8 26 312,847
Aragon 76 13.1 39 582,538
Andalusia 65 11.2 20 204,297
Navarre3 64 11.0 48 537,745
Catalonia 26 4.5 20 208,595
Galicia 3 0.5 1 12,937
Total 580 100.0 326 4,371,576
1: C.-La Mancha includes Madrid and Murcia.
2: C.-Leon includes La Rioja.
3: Navarre includes Álava (Basque Country).
Source: El Servicio Nacional de Crédito Agrícola, 1947-1961, Madrid, 1962. Authors’ creation.
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strument for industrializing the wine producing regions and regulating the 
wine market. Thanks to support from the State, the wine cooperatives ex-
panded rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s, not only in terms of  production but 
also in terms of  membership numbers (Table 1). Though membership was 
voluntary and the commitment to the cooperative meant a loss of  entrepre-
neurial freedom, as winegrowers were unable to take their own economic de-
cisions,43 the cooperatives could offer strong incentives to winegrowers, as 
they could pay them higher than market prices for their grapes; furthermore, 
the quality of the produce was not an issue. Small and large winegrowers alike 
joined the cooperatives, attracted by the high prices and by the fact that the 
State would now fund the enlargement and modernization of  the coopera-
tives, and thus relieve them of the burden of  investing in their businesses. 
The BCA replaced the SNCA as the provider of  financial assistance in the 
1960s and 1970s, intensifying the development and consolidation of  cooper-
ative wineries and other agricultural cooperatives. Between 1963 and 1966, 
for example, agricultural and rural credit cooperatives received 50% of the 
37.5 million pesetas that the BCA lent to all agricultural producers.44 In fact, 
the rate was probably higher, because these data do not include the loans for 
purchasing machinery and the credits that were channelled through the INC 
and other public institutions.45 As was the case with the financial assistance 
from the SNCA, the loans provided by the BCA were used mainly for the con-
struction or enlargement of  the wine cooperatives and for their technological 
modernization, but short-term loans for their management were also availa-
ble, and even individual loans to the members.46 
The interest rates on these loans were lower for the agricultural and rural 
credit cooperatives than for individual farmers, private businesses or agricul-
tural industries. In 1969, the average interest rates applied to agricultural co-
operatives and rural credit cooperatives were 3.66% and 3.75% respectively, 
compared with 4.7% for individual farmers (through rural credit coopera-
tives), 4.5% for private businesses, and 6.9% for agricultural industries. At 
that time, the interest rates applied to the cooperatives by the Spanish insti-
tutions were the lowest in Europe.47
In our view, State support for wine cooperatives is the key to understand-
ing their transformation after the Civil War. In the 1930s there were roughly 
100 small cooperative wineries producing very limited amounts of  wine. By 
43. Caballer (1982).
44. Medina-Albaladejo (2015a).
45. The INC carried out several projects for the creation of  cooperatives as rural colo-
nization groups. AGA, Sindicatos, 003.008. Proyectos de obras del Instituto Nacional de Sindi-
calización.
46. Medina-Albaladejo (2011), p. 279-280.
47. AGA, Ministerio de Agricultura, 61/13058. Documentación del Banco de Crédito 
Agrícola.
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the end of  the 1960s, the figure had risen to more than 700; their average size 
(in terms of  both membership and storage capacity) had doubled, and they 
now produced 50% of the total wine in Spain (Table 2). In regions like Cas-
tile-La Mancha, they became the leading winemaking companies, with large 
plants producing millions of  litres, and it is fair to say that they headed up 
the process of  industrialization of  the wine sector.48 The striking change in 
the regional distribution of  cooperative wineries in the 1950s and 1960s that 
we have examined above (Table 2 and Figure 4) was also clearly linked to the 
financial help provided by the State. 
Access to capital was indeed a critical problem for the development of 
winemaking cooperatives, but other important hurdles these concerns had to 
negotiate were overproduction and low prices (Figure 1). The Ministry of Ag-
riculture introduced measures mainly aimed at helping the cooperatives, as 
they produced wine in bulk using industrial methods. In the 1950s a Commis-
sion for the Purchase of  Surplus Wine (Comisión de Compras de Excedentes 
de Vino) was created to buy part of  the wine production from producers at 
above market prices. This institution also paid the cooperative wineries to 
stockpile part of  their annual production (through what were known as Pri-
mas de Inmovilización) and sell it in future years when production might be 
lower. This system, which included advanced provision of  public credit for 
the wine delivered or stocked in order to solve the crises of  low prices, was of 
limited importance in the 1950s, but in the 1960s and 1970s it became a ma-
jor source of  funding for the cooperative wineries. In 1966-67, for example, 
the cooperatives received 710 million pesetas under this system and 1,118 mil-
lion pesetas in 1969-70.49
At the end of  the 1960s and in the early 1970s, due to the intensification 
of  the problems of  overproduction caused by the new patterns of  demand 
and the fall in per capita consumption (Figure 2), cooperative wineries were 
forced to hand over 10% of their production to public institutions such as the 
Fund for the Management and Regulation of Agricultural Products and Pric-
es (Fondo para la Ordenación y Regulación de Productos y Precios Agrarios, 
FORPPA). The Compulsory Delivery of  Wine (Entrega Vínica Obligatoria, 
EVO) was exploited by the cooperatives, who gave over their lowest quality 
wine and sought good prices in the markets for their better produce. The wine 
delivered to the EVO was mainly distilled; as we will see in the next section, 
this solution to overproduction took on much greater relevance later, at the 
end of  the 1970s and during the 1980s (Figure 2). 
The State also provided assistance in the purchase of  inputs and machin-
ery for use in the vineyards, which were often imported. The cooperatives re-
48. Pan-Montojo (2003).
49. Fernández (2008).
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quested these services and the Ministry of  Agriculture found specialist com-
panies and provided partial funding for the purchase. The machinery acquired 
through this system could not be sold or rented for a period of four years, and 
its use was reserved for members of  the cooperatives, with preference being 
given to those with the lowest purchasing power. Other forms of  State sup-
port were the design of  buildings, aid to encourage exports, loans to buy raw 
materials, and individual credit for cooperative members. 
The late evolution under democracy (1975-present day)
The cooperative system that emerged under Franco’s dictatorship was 
highly regulated and protected by the State, and the wine cooperatives had a 
productivist orientation that responded to the need to transform all the grapes 
handed over by their members regardless of  the quality of  the final product, 
and to sell it mainly in local or regional markets. During the 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s the cooperative wineries notably increased their fixed capital or tangi-
ble assets. With the accession of new members, the cooperatives needed to ex-
pand their production and storage capacity. The consumption patterns of  the 
time favoured their development, as they could produce and market wines of 
low quality but well-suited to the demand from the Spanish domestic market, 
where standards of living were low, and home-grown goods were strongly pro-
tected against imports.
But in the 1980s the new patterns of  demand seen elsewhere finally 
reached Spain. Spanish consumers now drank wine less regularly but expect-
ed higher quality. In fact, consumption has fallen steadily ever since the mid-
1970s (Figure 2), especially in the case of  table wines.50 It was this change in 
the market conditions that posed the greatest challenges to the cooperative 
sector. During the dictatorship the cooperative sector had expanded, pro-
ducing large amounts of  very low quality wines, under strong State control. 
The cooperatives were part of  a hierarchical institutional system that did not 
leave them any autonomy to make decisions. Furthermore, the lack of  an 
ideological basis and social capital in these entities, which had been created 
from above during the dictatorship, made it difficult to introduce badly need-
ed changes. At the time of  Franco’s death, Spanish cooperative wineries were 
inefficient in areas such as financing, management, and production; they 
were excessively dependent on external debt, their production capacity was 
unnecessarily high, and they were not oriented to catering for the new pat-
terns of  demand.51 
50. Martínez-Carrión & Medina-Albaladejo (2010).
51. Medina-Albaladejo (2015a).
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With the return of  democracy, this model was dismantled and State inter-
vention was gradually placed in the hands of the regional governments, which 
began to regulate and support the cooperative movement through the enact-
ment of  legislation at regional levels. At the same time, after forty years of 
dictatorship, the first free cooperative organizations were created, gathering 
together many of Spain’s agricultural cooperatives. The Confederation of Ag-
ricultural Cooperatives (Confederación de Cooperativas Agrarias de España, 
CCAE),52 for example, was created in 1989 as a result of  the merger of  two 
previous associations created in the 1970s: the Spanish Association of  Agri-
cultural Cooperatives (Asociación Española de Cooperativas Agrarias, AECA) 
and the Union of  Agricultural Cooperatives of  Spain (Unión de Cooperativas 
Agrarias de España, UCAE). 
The seventeen regional federations of the country are associated in this in-
stitution, but they lack the strength to establish the overall strategies of the co-
operative sector. It was not possible to launch a restructuring and concentra-
tion process that might have enabled them to gain access to increasingly 
competitive markets – as had occurred, for example, in other major producing 
countries. In Italy, for example, wine cooperatives have gone through a major 
process of modernization in recent decades, and today they are solid and 
soundly organized companies, with a divisional structure and professional 
management, diversified product lines and distribution channels aimed at mul-
tiple markets, and the creation of second- and third-degree cooperatives (the 
so-called “consorzi di cooperative”). Consequently, in 2012 five out of the top 
ten Italian wine cooperatives were cooperative groups and two of them held 
the top positions in the ranking.53 In Spain, to the contrary, the inertia of the 
Franco regime’s cooperative model has marked the evolution of the sector ever 
since, making it difficult to adapt to the changing circumstances. As the Span-
ish cooperative wineries had not implemented more efficient organizational 
structures, by the early 1980s many of them were in serious difficulties; both 
their membership and their absolute numbers fell as a result (Table 2).
Moreover, the cooperative wineries and the Spanish wine industry had to 
adapt to the provisions of  the EEC during the early 1980s in order to prepare 
for Spain’s entry into the Community in 1986. The main goal was to reduce 
the supply of  wine in the European market to avoid a drop in prices. The sys-
tem of surplus treatment, which Spain had already implemented on a modest 
level since the 1950s, took on much greater significance with the country’s ac-
cession to the EEC and the adjustment policy imposed by Brussels via the 
Common Market Organization (CMO) in 1987, and also under the Common 
52. Today this association is named Agrifood Cooperatives (Cooperativas Agroalimen-
tarias).
53. Medina-Albaladejo (2016); Medina-Albaladejo & Menzani (2017).
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Agricultural Policy (CAP). This new legislative and regulatory framework en-
couraged the production of  quality wine, restricted that of  table wine (Regu-
lation 823/87), provided subsidies as incentives to reduce the area under vine, 
and imposed compulsory distillation (Regulation 822/87). The goal was to 
adjust supply to demand and prioritize the production of  higher quality 
wines, with the creation of  the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund 
(EAGF). 
This new legislative framework marked the sector’s evolution in the dem-
ocratic period. As Figure 2 shows, the exportation and processing of  wine 
(that is, its distillation or the production of vinegar) were small-scale concerns 
until the 1970s: almost 90% of the wine produced in the country was destined 
for domestic consumption. The problem of overproduction became particu-
larly serious in the 1970s because of  the expansion of  the area under vine and 
the improvement of  yields, which had risen from 11.8 Hl/Ha in 1954 to 24.6 
Hl/Ha in 1980.54 Increases in output and decreases in domestic consumption 
due to the new patterns of  demand led to problems of  overproduction and 
price stagnation until the mid-1980s (Figure 1). 
The two strategies applied to remedy the situation were the encourage-
ment of  exports and the promotion of  distillation (Figure 2). The preferen-
tial trade agreements which Spain had signed with the EEC in 1970 and the 
country’s later accession to the EEC in 1986 meant that many European mar-
kets which had been reserved for French and Italian wines were now open to 
competition from Spain. Since then, the promotion of  exports has been one 
of  the main strategies used to deal with the Spanish wine surplus. As a mat-
ter of  fact, since the mid-2000s exports have been higher than domestic con-
sumption, which explains the rise in the prices received by farmers since the 
mid-1980s (Figure 1), even though Spain became highly specialized in the 
bulk export of  low quality wines, sold at the lower end of  the international 
markets.55
The other instrument used to deal with overproduction was compulsory 
distillation imposed by the State and the EEC. Distillation had been rising 
since the mid-1970s (Figure 2). With Spain’s accession into the EEC, cooper-
atives sold their wine for distillation at low prices set by the European author-
ities in order to “punish” the wineries that recorded surpluses. However, in 
some areas of  Castile-La Mancha and Extremadura the prices for distillation 
were more attractive and profitable than those offered by cereals, the only al-
ternative crop in these regions. Therefore, the measure failed because it en-
couraged the production of surpluses instead of reducing it.56 In addition, the 
54. Ministerio de Agricultura, Anuario de Estadística Agraria, Madrid, 1954, 1980.
55. Fernández (2012); Martínez-Carrión & Medina-Albaladejo (2013).
56. Piqueras (2006).
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quota assigned to the distillation of  surpluses in the Treaty of  Accession was 
unable to redress the situation of  the Spanish wine sector. In 2010 Spain pro-
duced 36 million hectolitres, while domestic consumption was only 11 mil-
lion, and exports 18.6 million; so, the distillation of  4 million hectolitres was 
insufficient to remove the 6 million hectolitre surplus that Spain generated. 
In years of  high production (for example 2003), the surplus was over 8 mil-
lion hectolitres, which could have been as high as 15 million without compul-
sory distillation (Figure 2). 
In recent decades Spain has been the largest producer of  wine surpluses 
in Europe, with the cooperatives from Castile-La Mancha and Extremadura 
being the main causes of  this situation. These two wine producing regions ac-
counted in 2009 for more than 35% of the cooperative wineries in Spain; since 
1980 their number had increased significantly in Extremadura, and in Cas-
tile-La Mancha their share had also augmented, because of  the overall reduc-
tion due to the difficulties experienced by the whole sector and the need of 
restructuring. In the last thirty years, the restructuring process has been very 
severe in some regions with a very long tradition in cooperative wineries, in-
cluding Catalonia and Valencia (Table 2). In the case of  Castile-La Mancha, 
in 2009 the average production of  the cooperative wineries was nearly 70,000 
hectolitres, which was twice the national average; two cooperatives produced 
more than 500,000 hectolitres, and five produced between 250,000 and 
500,000.57 In the major wine producing regions of  Spain where most of  the 
cooperative wineries were based, these cooperatives became a source of 
low-standard wines, instead of  a means of  improving product quality – the 
original idea behind their creation.58
In 2008 there were 625 cooperative wineries operating in Spain, which 
produced about 70% of all Spanish wine (Table 1). In terms of  the number of 
cooperatives, these figures were very similar to those in neighbouring coun-
tries such as France (750) and Italy (583). However, in terms of  turnover 
Spain was clearly trailing behind: the respective figures were 5.1 billion euros 
for France, 3.2 billion euros for Italy, and 1.4 billion euros for Spain. Further-
more, none of the ten largest European cooperative wineries were from Spain: 
three Italian and two French companies led the ranking.59 In recent decades 
there have not been any wine cooperatives among the top twenty companies 
in the Spanish wine sector, which has always been dominated by the big pri-
vate groups located mainly in the regional appellations of  Cava, Jerez and La 
Rioja.60 
57. Langreo & Castillo Valero (2014), p. 158.
58. Fernández & Simpson (2017).
59. COGECA (2010).
60. Alimarket, Informe anual de bebidas (Madrid, several years).
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In Spain there have been some attempts to link groups of  cooperatives to-
gether for marketing purposes and to raise their competitiveness, but they 
have been less successful than similar endeavours in Italy or France. Some of 
these plans were already carried out under the dictatorship, such as the Co-
operativa Española de Comercialización de Productos del Campo, a national 
organization for marketing agricultural products, and at a regional level the 
Cooperativa Vinícola Navarra, which was launched in 1955 and grouped to-
gether more than twenty cooperative wineries in Navarre; eventually, howev-
er, both attempts failed.61 More recently, some autonomous initiatives had 
more successful results, such as the Centre Vinícola del Penedès, created in 
1985, which today bottles and sells wine for 13 cooperatives in Catalonia;62 
Anecoop, Coviñas and Bocopa in Valencia;63 Bocovin in Andalusia,64 and Baco 
in Castile-La Mancha. This, in fact, seems to have been the tendency in re-
cent years, although the Spanish wine cooperative sector is still highly frag-
mented and was slow to join the commercial networks of  bottled wines in in-
ternational markets; its position remains weak compared to the large 
cooperative groups from France and Italy and the growing competition from 
Southern Hemisphere countries such as Argentina, Chile and Australia. In 
2003, Spanish wine cooperatives exported less than 20% of their output and 
only bottled a similar proportion.65
Conclusion
Today, Spain has the largest planted surface of  vineyards in the world and 
it is one of  the world’s top wine producers alongside Italy and France. In 
2014, Spain exported 22.8 million hectolitres, surpassing France and Italy to 
become the world’s biggest exporter. However, much of  these exports were 
bulk sales with tiny margins that perpetuated the image of  Spanish wine as 
“cheap plonk”.66 In terms of  the exports value, Spain was far behind France 
and Italy. As a matter of  fact, the biggest buyer of  Spanish wines was France 
(5.8 million hectolitres), which often bottles and sells Spanish produce as 
French wine (Italy does the same with olive oil). In our view, these features 
of  Spain’s wine industry today are closely related to the historical patterns of 
State involvement in the cooperative sector. 
61. In 1975 COVINA had to be sold because of  serious financial problems. See Majue-
lo & Pascual (1991), p. 365-368.
62. Saumell (2004).
63. Medina-Albaladejo (2011).
64. Fuentes, Veroz & Artacho (2000), p. 58.
65. Confederación de Cooperativas Agrarias de España (2004).
66. The Guardian, 6 March 2015.
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In this article, we have argued that the main features of  the current Span-
ish wine cooperative sector are a legacy of  Franco’s times. It was during the 
dictatorship when the model for the wine cooperative sector was designed and 
experienced its most significant development. Prior to the Civil War, cooper-
ative wineries were few and far between; the sole exception was Catalonia, 
where a spontaneous cooperative movement had started with the support of 
the Catalan public authorities. But even in Catalonia the wine cooperatives 
were small-scale, their situation was precarious, and their share of  overall 
wine production was very low. 
If  the lack of  involvement of  the Spanish government was the main rea-
son for the slow development of  wine cooperatives before the Civil War, their 
expansion (both in their number and size) during Franco’s era was the result 
of  State intervention. A new model was designed with a productivist orienta-
tion and a high level of  State protection. Its aim was the social and econom-
ic control of  the wine sector, which was suffering from recurrent crises of 
overproduction. Long-term low-interest loans were provided for the construc-
tion or expansion of  wine cooperatives, and financial support was also pro-
vided to increase productivity and to stockpile part of  the wine surpluses at 
times of  falling prices. Most of  the State aid was assigned to winegrowing re-
gions with very little tradition in the cooperative movement, and the existing 
wine cooperatives were politically purged in order to stamp out any resem-
blance to their predecessors, which had been created bottom-up in the period 
before the Civil War. The geographical redistribution of the wine cooperatives 
changed so much under Franco because of  the authorities’ desire to establish 
a brand new cooperative model. The result was a new wine cooperative sec-
tor created top-down, highly integrated in the authoritarian regime, without 
any ideological grounding in cooperative principles, and oriented toward sell-
ing low quality wines in a highly protected market.
During the late twentieth century, the wine cooperatives had to adapt to 
changes in demand inside a much more competitive business environment. 
Within the new political context of  the democratic transition, the wine coop-
erative movement was less constricted but the inertia inherited from the pre-
vious period made changes more difficult. The disappearance of  many wine 
cooperatives in recent decades and the decreases in their membership bear 
witness to the obstacles they faced in their attempts to adapt to the new eco-
nomic situation, although they still produce 70% of the wine output. Of 
course, it was not only in Spain that cooperative wineries found it hard to 
compete, and it can be argued that some of  these problems are related to the 
very nature of  the cooperative venture itself.67 However, there are some suc-
cessful examples (especially in Italy and France) that demonstrate the capac-
67. Fernández & Simpson (2017).
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ity of  wine cooperatives to hold their own in a globalized economy. If  these 
examples are conspicuous by their absence in Spain it is surely a consequence 
of  the creation of  the cooperative model by the authoritarian regime. 
In this paper, we have focused our attention on the contribution of the State 
to the development of cooperative wineries. We have pointed out the need for 
a certain level of financial and technical support from the State, but we have 
also highlighted the dangers of State intervention – especially in the context of 
a dictatorship – regarding the adulteration of cooperative principles, con-
straints imposed on the free and democratic organization of these businesses, 
and the potentially detrimental effect on their economic development.
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■
Too little intervention or too much? The contribution of  the State to the de-
velopment of  wine cooperatives in Spain
abstRact
This article analyses the contribution of  the State to the expansion of  wine cooperatives 
in Spain over the course of  the twentieth and the early years of  the twenty-first centuries. We 
examine the legislation that created the institutional framework for their development, and the 
role of  the State in providing both financial and technical assistance. We show that the State’s 
contribution was critical to differences not just in the rate of  their expansion but also in their 
distribution throughout the main winegrowing regions of  Spain. Finally, we assess the conse-
quences of  State intervention on their overall performance, highlighting a lack of  involvement 
as the main reason for the slow development of  wine cooperatives in the early period, but also 
the dangers of  excessive State intervention later. 
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■
¿Poca intervención o excesiva? La contribución del Estado al desarrollo de 
las cooperativas vinícolas en España.
Resumen
Este artículo analiza la contribución del Estado a la expansión de las bodegas cooperati-
vas en España durante el siglo xx y los primeros años del siglo xxi. Examinamos la legislación 
que creó el marco institucional para el desarrollo de estas instituciones, y el papel del Estado 
en su asistencia técnica y financiera. Mostramos que la contribución del Estado es un elemen-
to fundamental para explicar las diferencias no solamente en el grado de desarrollo de las bo-
degas cooperativas, sino también en su distribución en las principales regiones vitícolas de Es-
paña. Finalmente, evaluamos las consecuencias de la intervención del Estado en su desempeño 
general, destacando su falta de implicación como la principal razón para su lento desarrollo 
en un primer período, pero también los peligros de su posterior interferencia excesiva.
PalabRas clave: bodegas cooperativas, intervencionismo estatal, siglo xx, España.
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